The screen of a GPS attached to the dashboard of a vehicle as residents of Dubai face GPS disruptions on March 9, 2026, in Dubai. The United Arab Emirates decried that it was being targeted “in a very unwarranted manner” in the war, stressing it would “not partake in any attacks against Iran”, which has lashed out at Gulf countries seen as US allies. (Photo by AFP via Getty Images)
– | Afp | Getty Images
Hours after the first salvos of the U.S. and Israel’s “pre-emptive” strikes against Iran on Feb. 28, the data analytics firm Kpler observed vessels in the Persian Gulf making unusual maneuvers, with location data from ships in the Gulf showing vessels traveling over land and making sharp turns in polygonal paths.
Since the start of the war, similar disruptions to location-based services have surged across the Middle East, affecting mariners, aircraft, and motorists alike.
These disruptions have also exposed key vulnerabilities of the GPS, an American-made system now synonymous with satellite navigation.
For years, firms like Kpler have flagged thousands of instances of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf manipulating onboard Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals — the system used to track vessels in transit — to evade sanctions on Iranian oil exports.
Known as spoofing, this manipulation of location signals allows vessels to obscure their movements, and has long been a tool of “covert” operations, according to Ana Subasic, a trade risk analyst from Kpler.
But since the start of hostilities in the Middle East, location spoofing in the Persian Gulf has surged dramatically. Within the first 24 hours of the conflict, maritime intelligence firm Windward logged over 1,100 different vessels across the Gulf experiencing AIS interference, followed by a 55% increase a week later.
Dire straits
“There are a lot of entities that are trying to jam GPS — or other satellite navigation signals — in the region with various reasons for doing so,” said Clayton Swope, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project from the Center for Strategic & International Studies, or CSIS, in an email to CNBC.
According to Swope, the added interference with satellite navigation signals across the region likely stems from Gulf states looking to protect against drone and missile strikes on critical infrastructure by “confusing” the onboard navigational systems of adversarial drones and missiles.
Such forms of electronic interference are increasingly being deployed as defensive countermeasures in modern warfare — similar disruptions followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, according to a CSIS report.
But this interference has also disrupted various aspects of everyday life.
Interference has caused aircraft to appear having traveled in erratic, wave-like patterns; on land, malfunctioning GPS systems have also caused food delivery riders to appear off the coast of Dubai.
The persistent jamming and spoofing activity in the region also poses key public safety concerns, according to Lisa Dyer, executive director of the GPS Innovation Alliance.
Although the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has significantly reduced shipping activity in the Persian Gulf, foreign-flagged vessels from countries like China and India have still been granted the right of transit.
For vessels still carrying crude exports from the Gulf, accurate positioning data is crucial for mitigating risks of collisions or running aground when passing through the narrow Strait, which measures only 21 miles (33 km) at its narrowest, Kpler’s Subasic said.
Beyond the navigational challenges for vessels and aircraft in the region, interference with satellite navigation systems could also hamper the responses of emergency services which rely on navigation aids, Dyer said, in a call with CNBC.
Turning to China?
Despite pervasive interference across the region, Iranian strikes have continued unabated, fueling speculation over the sources of Iran’s military capabilities.
“There is evidence, right now, that Iran has been given access to China’s BeiDou,” said Jack Hidary, CEO of navigation technology startup SandboxAQ, referring to China’s global satellite navigation system. “This is giving Iran greater accuracy in its missile strikes and its targeting,” Hidary told CNBC’s Dan Murphy in a televised interview on March 17.
Other analysts, cited in publications like Al Jazeera, have also attributed the apparent accuracy of Iranian strikes to its use of China’s BeiDou.
Missiles and drones often use a combination of satellite-based navigation systems, and other systems, like inertial navigation capabilities — which operate independent of satellite-based signals — for targeting.
Like the GPS — originally a U.S. Department of Defense project — Beijing developed BeiDou for military use following a perceived over-reliance on the U.S.-made GPS in the 1995 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when GPS disruptions allegedly resulted in the loss of ballistic missiles over the Taiwan Strait.
Now in its third iteration following its launch in 2000, BeiDou has been expanded to a range of commercial applications, and “features the largest network,” when compared against other constellations like the GPS, Europe’s Galileo and Russia’s Glonass, according to Luca Ferrara, general manager of AQNav, SandboxAQ’s navigation product.
While Tehran has not officially commented on its use of BeiDou, Ehsan Chitsaz, Iran’s deputy communications and information technology minister reportedly praised the accuracy and architecture of BeiDou after last June’s 12-day war between Iran and Israel, according to China’s state media Xinhua.
Iranian and Chinese authorities have not responded to CNBC’s requests for comment.
Nothing new
However, other analysts are unsurprised by these claims.
According to Swope from the CSIS, even if true, there is probably little significance in Iran’s use of BeiDou, as it “would not require active coordination or support from China.”
“Modern chips used for satellite navigation are capable of receiving signals from all the big four global satellite navigation systems — so Iran could be using BeiDou, or even GLONASS or Galileo,” Swope said.
Dyer from the GPS Innovation Alliance added that most commercial receivers “use [multiple] constellations for navigation,” which are “interoperable in some ways.”
Even if Iran were using BeiDou, as a satellite-based navigation system, it would still be vulnerable to the same jamming and spoofing risks as the GPS, Dyer said.
“Modern chips used for satellite navigation are capable of receiving signals from all the big four global satellite navigation systems — so Iran could be using BeiDou, or even GLONASS or Galileo.”
Clayton Swope
Deputy director, Aerospace Security Project, Center for Strategic & International Studies
To industry players, the war in the Middle East has exposed the vulnerabilities of satellite-based navigation systems.
“What is really being challenged now is the belief that satellite-based systems can serve as the sole foundation for positioning, navigation, and timing,” said Ferrara from SandboxAQ, which is trialing technology that relies on the earth’s magnetic field, rather than satellite signals.
The advent of satellite-based networks like China’s BeiDou and Russia’s Glonass also “challenges traditional U.S. strategic dominance,” Ferrara said, adding that these GPS alternatives have eroded the U.S.’ “leverage over global navigation.”
But Washington may yet have aces up its sleeve.
As speculation mounts over an impending ground invasion by U.S. forces, American forces may be among the least affected by the electronic interference that has enveloped the region.
According to Swope, U.S. forces have been upgrading to a new, “jam-resistant” GPS signal, designed for operations in environments with strong interference.
“Even with persistent interference… the military should still be able to conduct operations,” Swope said.
